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Abstract: Consider the case wherein a person refuses to listen to 
a woman’s testimony of leadership, due to the belief that women 
are incompetent. This is testimonial injustice. It involves the 
hearer’s prejudicial belief over the speaker’s socially imagined 
identity. This injustice creates lasting kinds of harms to one’s 
epistemic self-respect and freedom, as the hearer gives a 
decreased credibility level to the speaker. In Epistemic Injustice: 
Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Miranda Fricker proposes the 
virtue of testimonial justice, which aims to restrain identity 
prejudice from harming speakers. With this, the hearer reflexively 
identifies her prejudice and corrects or suspends it. In this essay, 
I argue that employing the cognitive attitude of suspension is 
counter-effective to the purpose of the virtue. I explain my 
argument through the following: 1) the relationship of inquiring 
attitudes (IAs) with the attitude of suspension; and 2) the 
argumentative function of reason. Through the suspension of 
prejudice an IA over the prejudice is acquired by the hearer. 
Consider, “Is my belief that all women are weak, true?” From this, 
the argumentative function of reason, and confirmation bias, a 
metacognitive desire to reaffirm and reestablish the prejudice 
arises. Thus, defeating the purpose of the virtue. As such, I suggest 
the attitude of acceptance instead, which serves as settled 
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judgement over the prejudice’s truth and need not involve belief. 
Through it, the hearer does not inquire over the status of the 
prejudice’s truth, removing the problems presented by suspension 
of judgement.  
 




INTRODUCTION: THE GRAVITY OF TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE 
 
While we often hear people talk about how women’s voices are silenced, 
many of us forget the gravity of its reality. To remind us of the nature of the 
problem discussed in my essay, consider the case of Natalie.1 Natalie is one 
of the eight rape survivors who partook in Courtney Ahrens’ research study 
titled “Being Silenced: The Impact of Negative Social Reactions on the 
Disclosure of Rape.”2 In the said study, Ahrens looked closely at the impact 
of the hearers’ responses to the speaker, which would be the rape victims 
sharing their testimonies. Natalie was raped by three men and was almost 
killed at the end.3 After explaining to the police what happened, they did 
not seem to care.4 As Natalie notes, “I remember one of the police officers 
laughed.”5 This incident led Natalie to question her own pain and fault, 
even as a victim. Eventually, Natalie became convinced that she should not 
communicate her truth to anyone else for it seemed not to be believable—
 
1 Courtney E. Ahrens, “Being Silenced: The Impact of Negative Social Reactions on the 
Disclosure of Rape,” in American Journal of Community Psychology, 38:3-4 (December 
2006), 263-274. 
2 Ibid. 
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her testimonies seemed unreliable.6 Such a pattern could be found as well 
amongst the seven other women who were part of the research study.  
However, women need not be in a “vulnerable” situation to be 
presented with such wrongfulness. In 2017, Tonja Jacobi and Dylan 
Schweers published a study on how female court Justices are unlawfully 
and unorderly interrupted during oral arguments by their male colleagues 
and advocates much more so than male justices are.7 Despite being 
individuals of high authority and recognizably reliable judgement, female 
justices continue to experience a pattern of disrespect as they speak. On 
what grounds were their testimonies, and a thousand that we have already 
heard before, unheard? By virtue of the prejudice of them being women.  
This is testimonial injustice. Before I explicate on its definition, I 
believe that two things must first be said regarding its nature: 1) that 
testimonial injustice is an injustice; and 2) that it is an injustice of the 
epistemic kind—regarding a person’s capacity as a knower. First, 
testimonial injustice is not simply a lack of solid form of justice.8 It is not 
the case that justice is primordial to it. In fact, it is the other way around. 
While not all injustices are considered as grave as Natalie’s, the ability of 
injustices to wrong people to a terrifying degree should be taken with 
utmost concern. The same goes for testimonial injustice. Second, 
testimonial injustice is epistemic in nature. It is a wrong done in regard of 
a person’s ability to know, which is an integral portion of human dignity.9 
To have a person’s ability to know be wronged by another can create lasting 
negative effects on the victim. It may be the case that they will not believe 
in their ability to learn complicated things anymore or believe that they will 
 
6 Ibid. 
7 Tonja Jacobi and Dylan Schweers, “Justice, Interrupted: The Effect of Gender, 
Ideology and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments,” in Virginia Law Review, 103:7 
(2017), 1379-1496. 
8 Miranda Fricker, “Testimonial Injustice,” in Epistemic Injustice: Power and the 
Ethics of Knowing (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2007), 9-29. 
9 Ibid. 
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never be reliable in the epistemic sense. Such effects can greatly hinder a 
person’s ability to live life well, aside from the detrimental harms caused 
on one’s dignity.     
Originally discussed and introduced by Miranda Fricker in her book 
Epistemic Injustice: The Power and Ethics of Knowing, testimonial 
injustice serves as the primary form of epistemic injustice, followed by 
hermeneutical.10 Fricker defines testimonial injustice as the injustice that 
“occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility 
to a speaker’s word” or a case of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit.11 
Focusing on the four-word phrase “identity-prejudicial credibility deficit”, 
let us break down the meaning behind testimonial injustice. 
First, testimonial injustice revolves around cases resulting from 
credibility deficit. In hearing testimonies, a hearer must assign a 
credibility level to the speaker.12 For example, if I ask my mother what it 
means to be an assertive leader, as a hearer, I assign a credibility level to 
her depending on how reliable and believable I think she is to give her 
testimony of being a leader. When we deal with testimonial injustice, we 
primarily deal with cases that involve a hearer giving deflated credibility 
level to the speaker.13 Natalie’s case is a primary example of this, as her 
hearers, say the police she reported to, did not consider Natalie’s words as 
credible—not even fit to be seriously thought of or considered.  Compare 
Natalie’s case to over-believing and seeking a man’s words of what it means 
to be strong. For Natalie, she received a deflated level of credibility from 
her hearers. For the latter example, people place an increased level of trust 
over the man and his testimony. 
From this we can see how in testimonial injustice, prejudice is a 
necessary element. The credibility deficit arises from prejudice, which 
are judgements that may either give positive or negative valence, with 
 
10 Ibid., 1-8. 
11 Ibid., 28-29.  
12 Ibid., 17. 
13 Ibid., 21. 
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resistance to counter evidence.14 In cases involved in testimonial injustice, 
we are primarily dealing with prejudices that are negative. Consider the 
prejudice that, “All women are bad at math” compared to “All women are 
good at cooking and smiling.” 
What kind of prejudice are we dealing with? It is what Fricker calls 
as identity prejudice. This stems from identity power, wherein an agent 
uses the socially imagined identity of a speaker to influence the latter's 
freedom.15 Looking back at the previous examples given, they were all cases 
which deal with prejudice involving the stereotype or socially imagined 
identity of the speaker. Furthermore, we can observe from these 
considerations that testimonial injustice is gendered, as much as it is racial 
and discriminatory in various aspects of a person's identity. 
 
THE FALLING SHORT OF SUSPENSION 
 
As a response to testimonial injustice, or to epistemic injustices in general, 
Fricker suggests a virtue that is aimed to restrain identity-prejudice from 
harming speakers in cases of testimonies: the virtue of testimonial 
justice. There are several important things to know about the nature of 
this virtue: 1) its corrective and anti-prejudicial nature; 2) its reflexive 
structure; and 3) its implementation. While other details were elucidated 
by Fricker in her book, I believe that three concepts are most crucial to our 
discussion.  
First, the virtue of testimonial justice is corrective and anti-
prejudicial in the sense that the virtue holds the hearer to correct and 
prevent oneself from allowing prejudice to hinder her ability in justly 
assessing the speaker’s testimonies.16 The virtue is meant to be employed 
as hearers in cases of testimonies. Second, the structure of the virtue is 
reflexive. It is reflexive in the sense that having such a virtue would render 
 
14 Ibid., 30-59. 
15 Ibid., 14-17. 
16 Ibid., 86-108. 
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an individual reflexively critically aware with one’s possible prejudice 
against a speaker.17 In relation to the corrective nature of the virtue, when 
a hearer senses that she has prejudice over a speaker, the former must 
reflexively correct herself. Lastly, Fricker suggests that we can do this 
through either correcting or suspending the prejudice or the credibility 
judgement.18  
I believe that if we are to truly attempt to counter testimonial 
injustice with the virtue of testimonial justice, we ought to carefully 
delineate its parts—particularly its implementation. In this essay, I would 
like to specifically focus on the option to suspend prejudice or the 
credibility judgement. While Fricker did not expound on its nature, we can 
see that it is a cognitive attitude towards a belief or a judgement. Fricker 
defines prejudice as follows: “Prejudices are judgements, which may have 
a positive or a negative valence, and which display some (typically, 
epistemically culpable) resistance to counter-evidence owing to some 
affective investment on the part of the subject.”19 As judgements, prejudices 
can either be a person’s belief that x, or a person’s residual commitment 
that x, even if she does not believe that x.20 
Like the latter, it is important to note that there are cases wherein 
prejudices are not simply a belief. It can be the case that even if people have 
wholeheartedly grown out their previous prejudices, they have residual 
commitment to doing things in accordance with such prejudice.21 Say, 
Christian—a person who used to have the prejudice against the LGBTQ+ 
community and held the belief that transwomen are not real women. When 
Christian became a father to a transwoman, he genuinely did not believe 
his prejudice anymore and would like to support his daughter fully. 
However, it can be the case that because of the prejudice that Christian 
 
17 Ibid., 91. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 35. 
20 Ibid., 37. 
21 Ibid. 
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held, he tends to disregard his daughter’s opinion on what it is to be a 
woman—not because he believes in his prejudice but because he was 
conditioned to habitually do the things in accordance with it. As a strongly 
held commitment akin to that of a belief or a quasi-belief, I will be calling 
both kinds of prejudices as judgements or beliefs interchangeably for the 
virtue addresses them the same.  The same goes for the suspension of giving 
the credibility judgement over the speaker. Recognizing the prejudice, it is 
inevitable that the credibility judgement that the hearer will give to the 
speaker is one that is prejudicial in nature, if the virtue will not be properly 
employed. As such, I will be referring to the two as suspended prejudice in 
this essay.  
There are several theories as to the structure of the suspension of 
judgement. One of these is the metacognitive view of suspended beliefs, 
wherein suspending judgements is believing that one cannot yet determine 
whether x or not x.22 Another view is to equate the suspension of judgement 
to doxastic neutrality wherein a person would neither accept that x or 
accept that not x.23 Regardless of which theory of suspensive attitude we 
would be abiding to, the essence is that the hearer is not disbelieving her 
prejudices but rather tranquilizes it for the time being until she can finally 
correct it or decides to reaffirm it.  
With these in mind, I argue that employing the cognitive attitude of 
suspension of prejudice is counter-effective to the purpose of the virtue of 
testimonial justice. My aim for this paper is to contribute to the expansion 
of the virtue by refuting suspension as a cognitive attitude fit for it. In the 
succeeding sections of this paper, I will explore on how that the option to 
suspend one’s judgement is counter-effective to the goal of mitigating 
testimonial injustices as it urges the hearer to reinstate and reestablish the 
suspended prejudice, which is against the goal of the virtue. 
 
22 Thomas Raleigh, “Suspending Is Believing,” in Synthese, (2019), 1-26.  
23 Ibid. 
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To demonstrate this, I used the following framework: 1) the 
relationship of inquiring or interrogative attitudes (IAs) with the attitude 
of suspension; and 2) the argumentative function of reason. First, I 
explained how when a hearer arrives at the suspended prejudice, she 
arrives with an IA, such as inquiry, curiosity, and deliberation, towards that 
prejudice. I made use of Jane Friedman’s analysis in her essay “Why 
Suspend Judgement?”, supported by her latter work “Inquiry and Belief”.24 
In the former work, Friedman discussed her biconditional argument that 
inquiry entails suspension of judgement, and suspension of judgement 
entails inquiry. On the latter, she dived deeper into the relationship of 
inquiry, its nature, and that of belief’s. I integrated these into explaining 
how the points of events that a hearer goes through in suspending one’s 
judgement meets the necessary elements in having IAs over the suspended 
prejudice. Second, I discussed why having IAs over the prejudice, in cases 
of hearing testimonies, is dangerous to the goals of the virtue. I believe that 
this can be accounted for by the argumentative function of reasoning in 
conjunction with confirmation bias. Using Lehner et al.’s research study on 
the impact and prevalence of confirmation bias in complex analyses and 
Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber’s analysis on argumentation as the main 
function of reasoning, we can observe that humans tend to reason, 
evaluate, and interpret beliefs favorably towards those which are not 
against their own.25 Because of these, hearers who have suspended their 
prejudice will lean towards reinstating and further reestablishing their 
prejudices. This may come through succumbing to the straw man fallacy in 
listening to the speaker’s testimonies, and other probable forms. Thus, 
defeating the point of the virtue of testimonial justice.  
 
24 Jane Friedman, “Why Suspend Judging?,” in Noûs, 51:2 (December 24, 2015), 302-
326; Jane Friedman, “Inquiry and Belief,” in Noûs, 53:2 (August 26, 2017), 296-315.  
25 Paul E. Lehner et al., “Confirmation Bias in Complex Analyses,” in IEEE 
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics - Part A: Systems and Humans, 38:3 
(2008), 584-592,; Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, “Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments 
for an Argumentative Theory,” in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34:2 (2011), 57-74. 
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With this, I offer the attitude of acceptance instead. I believe that it 
would benefit the virtue’s goals if the hearers are to accept the direct 
opposite of their prejudice. Following Jesús Mosterin’s model of 
acceptance without belief, I highlighted three elements of acceptance that 
shows how such an attitude does not succumb to the same problems that 
suspension face.26 These would be will, rationality, and context-
dependence. Afterwards, I discuss some of the probable criticisms that my 
argument faces, as well as recommendations for future studies regarding 
the virtue of testimonial justice. 
 
THE BIRTH OF INQUIRING ATTITUDES 
 
Explicated by Friedman, IAs are a class of attitudes which are goal-directed 
and questioning by nature27. It comes with the desire for epistemic 
satisfaction.28 These are attitudes such as curiosity, wonder, and 
deliberation. To illustrate how IAs come about from the suspended 
prejudice, let us consider the following chronological points that intuitively 
happen at the beginning of hearing out testimonies, with suspended 
prejudice: 
 
Point A: When the hearer enters a situation wherein a speaker 
begins to give testimony, and in turn assign a credibility level to 
the latter.  
Point B: When the hearer realizes that she has prejudice over the 
speaker. 
Point C: When the hearer decides to suspend the prejudice. 
 
 
26 Jesús Mosterín, “Acceptance without Belief,” in Manuscrito: Revista Internacional 
De Filosofia, 25:2 (2002), 313-335. 
27 Friedman, “Inquiry and Belief,” 2.  
28 Ibid., 4. 
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By point A, the hearer is placed in a situation wherein she naturally 
has to assign a credibility level to the speaker. As such, an inquiry or a 
metacognitive desire directed at the question of judgment involving the 
speaker's reliability and identity will stand. The cognitive goal to judge or 
assess the reliability of the speaker is present. For example, the police, or 
any hearer, will start to be curious about Q: the credibility of the rape 
survivor, or any speaker, in giving out her testimony regarding the crime. 
At this point of having inquiry over Q, it is entailed that the hearer also 
suspended her judgement over Q.29 This may come in the form of, “I cannot 
determine whether the rape survivor is credible or not” and other various 
forms. The inquiry over Q is governed by what Friedman calls as the 
ignorance norm wherein when a person ought not have an IA over Q at time 
t if the person knows Q at period t.30 This means that when an individual 
has an IA over Q, that individual does not know the answer to Q.31 In other 
words, when one develops an IA towards Q, that person “treats Q as open” 
and thus, suspends her judgement over it.32 
When one genuinely inquires over a question, one wants to figure it 
out or resolve it.33 This may either be through active or passive inquiry – 
the effort or will to seek out evidence to address the question may either be 
passive or active.34 However, being in point A, the hearer has to search for 
evidence and signs that will help enable her to determine the credibility 
level of the speaker. The hearer has to do this before having to evaluate the 
testimony given by the speaker. With this, I believe that in cases of hearing 
testimonies, the hearer is on an active inquiry regarding Q.  In looking for 
proofs regarding the reliability of the speaker, the hearer will eventually 
reach point B, wherein she realizes the existence of prejudice over the 
 
29 Friedman, “Why Suspend Judging?,” 14-20. 
30 Ibid., 18. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Friedman, “Inquiry and Belief?,” 4. 
34 Friedman, “Why Suspend Judging?,” 12. 
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speaker’s identity is directly tied to how we perceive a person’s reliability. 
Let us consider prejudice P: that rape survivors, or any speaker, were 
asking for it, or any relevant negative judgement. 
 Once the hearer decides to suspend the P, she moves to point C. At 
this point, the second half of Friedman’s biconditional argument comes 
into play, wherein suspension would entail inquiry.35 Friedman argues that, 
“anyone who is suspended is oriented in this sort of way [inquiring state of 
mind] with respect to the focal question—she aims to close that question.”36 
This implies that by suspending P, the hearer develops an IA towards it. It 
is important to note that this inquiry may or may not be active or eager. 
Nonetheless, by suspending P, there exists even a “minimal sensitivity to 
information that bears on the question” over P’s settlement.37 Consider 
being sensitive to verbal and nonverbal cues from the speaker that would 
affirm to the hearer if P.  
 
THE DANGERS OF IAS AND ACCEPTANCE AS KEY 
 
Why should we then be concerned if during such cases, the hearer has an 
IA towards the suspended prejudice? This can be accounted for by: 1) 
confirmation bias, and 2) the argumentative function of reason. 
Confirmation bias pertains to the near-universal tendency to accept and 
lean towards new evidence that affirm our existing beliefs.38 It is a form of 
cognitive bias and heuristics that help bring about belief and its 
propagation.39 Through this tendency, we seek and interpret evidence in a 
manner that favors our existing beliefs, expectations, and the like.40 This is 
suggested by the results of Lehner et al.'s research regarding the effects and 
 
35 Ibid., 24. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 28. 
38 Axel Gelfert, “Fake News: A Definition,” in Informal Logic, 38:1 (2018), 84–117.  
39 Ibid., 111. 
40 Mercier and Sperber, “Why Humans Reason,” 63-65. 
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manifestation of confirmation bias in complex analyses even amongst 
professionals with intelligence analysis experience.41 Their participants 
were experts in research and development and enthusiasts of intelligence 
analyses, some with actual experience over it.42 Their results showed that 
confirmation bias significantly impacted how the participants assessed new 
evidence based on their beliefs.43 While the participants tended to agree on 
the interpretation of the evidence all together, for example if it confirmed 
or disconfirmed their hypothesis, they tended to disagree on the 
importance of the evidence.44 They gave more weight to the evidence that 
supported their preferred hypothesis and less weight to evidence that 
disconfirmed it.45 
 This can be linked to the main function of reasoning as argued by 
Mercier, wherein reasoning has evolved to enable humans to communicate 
advantageously—through argumentation.46 Because of this function of 
reasoning, humans tend to reason, evaluate, and interpret beliefs towards 
those which are not against their own.47 Because of these, hearers who have 
suspended their prejudice will lean towards reinstating and further 
reestablishing their prejudices, in which they are also inquiring over or 
trying to resolve. Thus, defeating the point of the virtue of testimonial 
justice. 
 If suspending one’s prejudices in listening to testimonies is 
insufficient to uphold the goal of testimonial justice, what attitude then 
does the hearer have as an option aside from disbelieving the prejudice? I 
argue that it should be acceptance. I believe that accepting the direct 
opposite of P will enable the hearer to not succumb over the dangers that 
 





46 Mercier, “Why Humans Reason,” 57-111. 
47 Ibid., 65-66. 
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suspending P presented. To understand this, let us recall the root of 
suspension’s harms: from the birth of IAs. If the attitude of acceptance 
removes the possibility of an IA over P to arise, it will not face the same 
harms that suspension does.  
 The ignorance norm discussed in the previous section suggests that 
one cannot inquire over a question that one already knows the answer to.48 
In other words, one cannot have an IA over a question if she has a settled 
belief or judgement over it.49 It may be too difficult and idealistic for a 
person with prejudice over the speaker to completely and quickly disbelieve 
or disregard P after point B. As such, I wanted to propose an alternative 
attitude that has a settled judgement over P but does not require complete 
belief against it. The attitude of acceptance meets these requirements.  
 Following Mosterín’s model of acceptance, I would like to highlight 
three elements of acceptance that differentiate it from belief.50 These are 
will, rationality, and context dependence. Starting with will, belief is often 
not subjected to direct voluntary control.51 Usually, if not always, we do not 
have an active say or cognitive choice on what we believe in. As highlighted 
by Mosterín, we can only attempt to convince ourselves to believe 
something by looking for evidence or considerations.52 We only find 
ourselves believing and not actively choosing to do so. On the contrary, 
acceptance involves our will.53 Consider listening to a friend who has a 
dilemma over choosing. In helping her evaluate which choice is best, you 
both accept the choices one at a time to move forward in your assessment. 
You do not believe yet that either of the choices is right or wrong, but you 
accept it as basis for evaluation. This active epistemic decision is often 
 
48 Friedman, “Why Suspend Judging?,” 18. 
49 Ibid. 
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found in the sciences or in the field of law.54 For example, you used your 
scientific calculator to answer a math problem and you kept on getting 
unexpectedly big numbers as a result. You do not believe it, but in your 
desire to finish the problem, you accept it.  
 The second defining factor of acceptance against belief is their 
relationship to rationality. Rationality helps us determine not what to 
believe, rather what to accept.55 Rationality is directly linked with decision 
making and as acceptance involves making a certain decision, the two are 
intertwined. The last factor that I would like to highlight is context 
dependence. When it comes to beliefs, no matter how risky they may be, we 
believe them—especially the strongly held ones. On the contrary, we tend 
to accept things in certain contexts or circumstances.56 We tend to be more 
mindful of what we accept when risks are involved.57 With these, we can 
observe that acceptance need not the belief that not P, and also served as a 
settled response to the status of P for the context of the hearing of the 
testimony. Going back to our example of Natalie’s case, if the police were 
to accept that not P, moving through the investigation or interview of her 
account of the crime, the hearers would not need to inquire further, at least 
for that context and period of time, regarding P. This is because they will 




One possible response to my argument is that it need not matter what kind 
of cognitive attitude we employ with the virtue. Perhaps a more preemptive 
question we ought to answer is how we can encourage people to employ the 
virtue in the first place. With this, I agree that discussing how we can allow 
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anyone who is interested in epistemic justice. However, I believe that it is 
still a necessity to clarify and sort out the intricacies of such a virtue that 
revolves around justice—or an injustice. This is because to employ a 
problematic virtue may render our efforts of advocating for it as useless. 
Furthermore, while the process of specifying the various aspects of the 
virtue puts it at risk of becoming overcomplicated, I believe that in our 
pursuit of bettering the human condition, such risks should not hinder us 
from identifying the possible ways to improve the virtue—or any 
philosophical concept for that matter. 
 Another possible criticism is that suspending judgement can be a 
settled belief in and of itself, thus IAs cannot rise. One might say that there 
are cases of suspended judgements that function as settled beliefs. This 
means that the judgment is not open for inquiry, deliberation or any IA. 
Take for example, J: that I cannot know whether God exists or not. Some 
may consider this as a form of suspension. In the literature, we can either 
interpret this as a complete belief that one cannot know about God’s 
existence, or a maximally high credence over the status of the question over 
God’s existence. Either way, as Friedman notes, it makes sense to say “I 
cannot know whether God exists or not, but I still wonder whether He truly 
exists or not”.58 This demonstrates how IAs are compatible with such forms 
of suspensions as well. 
 Lastly, one can argue that the attitude of acceptance is akin to 
suspension and succumbs to the same dangers of the latter. Acceptance can 
be argued as a certain form of suspension wherein one temporarily plasters 
over assessing a belief or judgment status. Consider accepting COVID-19 
number projections. With this, one is putting on hold the inquiry over how 
long the pandemic will last and how many more people will be affected. It 
is evident that the acceptance in this case led to a suspension of 
judgement—on how much longer the pandemic will last. I believe that in 
this case, it is important to note that while acceptance can retroactively 
 
58 Friedman, “Inquiry and Belief,” 12.  
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create a suspended judgement; at the point wherein the hearer currently 
accepts the judgement, inquiry is ceased. This serves as the key difference 
between actual suspension and acceptance. With suspension, inquiry 
comes hand in hand at the same point of time towards the same question. 
However, it seems that acceptance cannot give rise to inquiry over the same 
question at the same period of time. This is because acceptance functions 
as a pseudo-knowledge, albeit temporarily, that closes and settles one’s 




In this paper, I have discussed the importance of addressing testimonial 
injustices through the virtue of testimonial justice. From this, I have 
highlighted where the option to suspend one’s judgement in the 
employment of the virtue can be proven counter-effective to the latter’s 
goals. Suspension or agnosticism towards one’s prejudices gives rise to 
inquiring attitudes, which encourages the originally suspended prejudices 
to reaffirm and reestablish itself. As such, I proposed using the attitude of 
acceptance instead, which ideally removes the harms that suspension face. 
Acceptance does this through serving as a settled judgement over the 
prejudice’s status, despite not being a complete belief. This provides more 
certainty in the removal of the discrimination caused by the prejudice and 
does not succumb to the issues that suspension of judgement faces. 
 I believe that there is more to be said about testimonial justice, and 
even more so for testimonial injustice. Perhaps in further studies we may 
be able to consider more complex cases of testimonies that may require 
other cognitive attitudes as options in applying the virtue, such as faith. 
Furthermore, we may also look closer into hermeneutical injustice and the 
manner of mitigating such and if suspension of judgement also functions 
the same way through it. As for the other theories I have applied in my 
study, I believe that their debates (i.e., Inquiring Attitudes against 
Suspension of Judgement, and Acceptance against Belief) can also be a 
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source for further analysis. Overall, I hope to have contributed to the goal 
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